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1 Introduction
Consider a set of agents and a set of allocations over which each agent has a preference
relation. Suppose an allocation is proposed. A coalition (a subset) of agents blocks the
allocation if all its members can improve upon the allocation by seceding and remaining
at least as well as they were at the proposed allocation and at least one of them being
strictly better o¤. The Core is the set of unblocked allocations. The Core and the Shapley
value have been the most undisputed and used solution concepts for cooperative games.
The Core emphasizes the stability requirements of the social institution that has to propose
allocations as potential solutions of the problem.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the Core for
ordinal, two-sided and many-to-one matching problems.1 A matching problem consists of
two non-empty and disjoint sets of agents: the set of rms (or institutions like schools,
colleges, hospitals, etc.) and the set of workers (or individuals like children, students,
medical interns, etc.). An allocation for a matching problem is a matching among rms
and workers with the property that each worker can be matched to at most one rm and
each rm is matched to a subset (possibly empty) of workers, keeping the bilateral nature
of the relationships in the sense that if a worker is matched to a rm this rm is matched
to a subset of workers that contains this worker. Each worker has a strict preference
relation on the set of rms plus the prospect of remaining unmatched. Each rm has a
strict preference relation on the set of all subsets of workers. A preference prole is a list
of preference relations, one for each agent. The Core of a matching problem (at a given
preference prole) is the set of matchings that are not blocked; namely, a matching is
in the Core if there is no subset of agents (a coalition of rms and workers) such that, by
rematching only among themselves, each agent gets a weakly better partner and at least one
of them gets a strictly better one. There is a large literature studying the Core of matching
problems (and related models) as well as the strategic incentives induced to agents by direct
revelation mechanisms that select a Core matching for each declared preference prole.2
1From now on we will refer to an instance of those as a matching problem. See Echenique and Oviedo
(2004) for an analysis of the Core of any matching problem using Tarkis Fixed Point Theorem.
2See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for an illuminating and comprehensive survey of this litera-
ture as well as for an exhaustive bibliography that Al Roth maintains updated in his webside
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The rst result of the paper characterizes the family of equivalence classes of preference
relations of each rm with the property that two preference relations are in the same
class if and only if they have the same Core for all preference relations of the remaining
agents. Thus, it shows how to partition the set of preference proles into subsets with the
property that all preference proles in the same subset have the same Core. Specically,
take a preference prole and a rm. Consider two subsets of workers S and S 0: Suppose
that the rm prefers S to S 0. Replace in the original preference prole the preference
relation of the rm with another one in which now the rm prefers S 0 to S and all other
orderings remain unchanged. Depending on the original preference prole, the selected
rm and the two subsets of workers S and S 0, the Core may either change or remain
the same. Our invariance result (Theorem 1) identies those orderings between pairs of
subsets of workers in a preference relation of a rm that, if inverted, the Core remains
unchanged for all possible preference relations of the other agents. In other words, Theorem
1 identies irrelevant changes on a preference relation of a rm that leave the Core invariant,
irrespectively of the other agentspreference relations. The way of proceeding with this
identication is as follows. Note rst that a preference relation of a rm strictly orders
all subsets of workers (i.e., it is a complete binary relation on the power set of the set of
workers). Build a new binary relation by rst constructing a family of subsets of workers
with the property that a set is in the family if and only if the rm, if confronted with this set
of workers, considers that the set itself is the best among all of its subsets according to the
rms (complete and original) preference relation; equivalently, erase from the power set of
the set of workers those subsets that, if o¤ered to the rm, would not be chosen because the
rm would like to re some of its workers. We call this collection of subsets of workers the
family of individually rational subsets of workers relative to the rms preference relation.
Second we dene a binary relation on this family as follows: given two subsets of workers S
and S 0 in the family we declare that S is preferred to S 0 (according to the binary relation) if
and only if S is the best subset (according to the original and complete preference relation of
the rm) among all subsets of S[S 0; otherwise, the subsets are left unordered by the binary
relation. Observe that in general this binary relation is incomplete and only dened on a
subfamily of subsets of workers. It turns out that this binary relation inherits some (but
http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html.
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not all)3 properties of the original preference relation and can be used as the representative
of one equivalence class because all preference relations of the rm that share the same
binary relation constructed as we just described have the property that the Core is the
same regardless of the other agentspreference relations. Note that, given a preference
relation of a worker, we could similarly construct its corresponding binary relation on the
set of acceptable rms. However, this binary relation on the set of acceptable rms coincides
with the initial complete preference relation (on the set of acceptable rms) since the best
rm of the union of two di¤erent rms is always equal the best of the two rms. Thus,
from the point of view of the workers preference relations all orderings (between pairs
of acceptable rms) are relevant for the set of Core matchings. This is the reason why
preference relations of workers will remain xed while we identify equivalence classes of
preferences of rms.
Theorem 1 extends and generalizes our previous result in Martínez, Massó, Neme, and
Oviedo (2008) where we construct this invariant partition only for the subclass of substi-
tutable preference proles.4 In this case, the Core and the set of stable matchings coincide,
are non-empty, and the binary relations obtained from the preference relations of the rms,
as we have described above, have more structure. They are individually rational, ordered,
and closed semilattices.5
3It is a reexive, antisymmetric, and acyclic binary relation that has a maximal element on the family
of individually rational subsets of workers. In general, it is not transitive.
4A preference relation of a rm is substitutable if the desirability of a worker w in a particular set of
workers does not come from the presence of another worker w0 in that set because the rm still wants to hire
worker w even when worker w0 is not available anymore; i.e., substitutable preference relations do not exhibit
strong complementarities among workers. A preference prole is substitutable if the preference relations of
all rms are substitutable. Kelso and Crawford (1982) were the rst to dene and use substitutability in a
more general matching model with money.
5A semilattice is a partially ordered set with the property that the least upper bound of any pair of
elements in the set exists. A semilattice is individually rational if the partially ordered family of subsets
of workers is composed of those sets that are preferred to their subsets. A semilattice is ordered if for all
subsets S and S0 in the partially ordered family of subsets of workers, the least upper bound (according to
the partial order) of S and S0 coincides with the least upper bound (according to the partial order) of all
subsets of S [ S0, and in addition, this set is contained in S [ S0. A semilattice is closed if all subsets of
each set in the family are themselves elements of the family.
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In general, the binary relation used to represent the equivalence class formed by all
preference relations of a rm that leave the Core invariant still relates too many pairs of
subsets of workers. In centralized matching markets in which Core mechanisms (stable ones,
whenever rmspreferences are substitutable) are used to suggest to the participants  after
collecting and processing their preference relations  a matching in the Core, it would be
very useful to use the smallest possible amount of information contained in the preference
prole that still allows to compute a Core matching relative to this preference prole.6
Thus, and in order to identify this minimal amount of information, we give a procedure to
construct the minimal binary relation contained in the binary relation identied in Theorem
1, with the property that it still can generate all preference relations in the same equivalence
class (that is, with the same Core) as their strict extensions. Furthermore, this binary
relation is minimal in the sense that any strictly weaker (i.e., strictly contained) binary
relation has at least two strict extensions that belong to di¤erent equivalence classes and
thus have di¤erent Cores for some preference relations of the other agents. We say that a
preference relation (over the set of all subsets of workers) is a strict extension of a binary
relation (on the family of individually rational subsets of workers) if (1) the preference
relation agrees on all pairs already related by the binary relation, (2) a set in the family is
declared as strictly preferred by the extension to all of its strict subsets, and (3) any set
that does not belong to the family has a strict subset in the family that is strictly preferred
by the extension.
Observe that the question of nding the minimal binary relation that can generate
all equivalent preference relations was not even asked in Martínez, Massó, Neme, and
Oviedo (2008) for the subclass of substitutable preference relations. Thus, the marginal
contribution of this paper in relation to our former one is two-fold. We rst extend the
result of Theorem 1 from substitutable preference proles to any preference prole. Second,
we identify for each preference relation (substitutable or not) the minimal binary relation
that can be used as the representative of each equivalence class of preference relations with
an invariant Core. This binary relation contains the indispensable and, at the same time,
6Again, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a general description and analysis of these centralized
markets. Niederle, Roth, and Sönmez (2008) contains a recent overview on matching and market design in
general.
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minimal information to generate the full class.
Echenique (2008) answers a related question. Suppose we observe a set of matchings
and we do not know agentspreference relations. Are there preference relations for the
agents so that the observed set of matchings are stable? If yes, the set of matchings is said
to be rationalizable. Echenique (2008) rst shows that there are sets of matchings that are
not rationalizable (and thus, the theory is testable) and second he identies conditions that
characterize the sets of matchings that are rationalizable: a necessary condition is that a
certain graph has no odd cycles and a necessary and su¢ cient condition is in terms of no odd
cycles and a certain system of polynomial inequalities. However, his results are di¤erent
from ours in many respects. Echeniques results apply only to the one-to-one matching
model while ours apply to the more general many-to-one matching model. His results are
in graph-theoretical terms and deal with the full preference prole by identifying how agents
can rank potential partners given the set of matchings to be rationalizable. In contrast we
identify, given a preference relation of a rm over subsets of workers (and independently of
the other agentspreferences), those relations between pairs of subsets of workers that are
critical from the point of view of the Core and those that are not.
Before nishing this Introduction we want to emphasize that, besides their intrinsic
interest, our invariance and minimality results have also at least three di¤erent type of
relevant implications. (1) Informational: our results show that the amount of information
about rmspreferences required to compute the set of Core matchings may be signicantly
smaller than the amount needed to describe their complete preference relations. This may
be specially relevant for running direct preference revelation Core mechanisms in central-
ized entry-level professional labor markets. (2) Computational: our results may simplify
the task of computing the set of Core matchings. They show that for this purpose it suf-
ces to compute the Core at those proles for which rmscomplete preference relations
are replaced by their corresponding minimal binary relations. For instance, suppose we
know the Core at a given prole. Consider another preference prole whose rmspref-
erence relations induce the same prole of minimal binary relations than the former one.
Then our results say that the Core at the two proles coincide. (3) Behavioral: our results
simplify the analysis of the strategic behavior induced on rms by centralized Core match-
ing mechanisms. In particular, to nd either best-replies or unilateral deviations may be
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substantially easier.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the notation, the basic
denitions, and some preliminary results. In Section 3 we state and prove the invariance
result for the set of Core matchings. In Section 4 we dene the notions of minimal binary
relation, strict extension and state and prove the minimality result. Finally, in Section 5 we
conclude with a general description of the procedure that partitions the set of preference
proles.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Agents and Preferences
Let W be the set of workers and let F be the set of rms. We assume that W and F
are nite and disjoint. The set of agents is W [ F . Each worker w 2 W has a preference
relation Pw over the set of rms plus the prospect of remaining unemployed. We assume
that Pw is strict. Specically, Pw is a complete, irreexive, and transitive binary relation
on F [ f?g, where ? means that w is not hired by any rm.7 Given Pw; let Rw be the
weak preference relation over F [f?g induced by Pw as follows: for f; f 0 2 F [f?g; fRwf 0
if and only if f 0Pwf does not hold. Then, Rw is a complete, reexive, antisymmetric,
and transitive binary relation on F [ f?g:8 Each rm f 2 F has a preference relation
Pf over the family of all subsets of workers. We assume that Pf is strict. Specically,
Pf is a complete, irreexive, and transitive binary relation on 2W ; where the empty set is
interpreted as the prospect of not hiring any worker. Given rm fs preference relation Pf
and a subset of workers S, Ch(S; Pf ) denotes fs most-preferred subset of S according to
Pf . Generically, we will refer to this set as the choice set. Given Pf , let Rf be the complete,
reexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation induced similarly on 2W by Pf . A
preference prole P = ((Pf )f2F ; (Pw)w2W ) is a jF j+ jW j  tuple of preference relations, one
for each agent. Given a preference prole P and fs preference relation P 0f , we will denote
7A binary relation  on X is complete if for all x; y 2 X such that x 6= y, either x  y or y  x;
irreexive if x  x for all x 2 X; and transitive if for all x; y; z 2 X such that x  y  z; x  z holds.
8A binary relation  on X is reexive if x  x for all x 2 X; and antisymmetric if, for all x; y 2 X such
that x  y and y  x, x = y holds:
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by (P 0f ; P f ) the original preference prole P after replacing Pf by P
0
f and refer to P f
as a subprole. Given a preference relation Pf of rm f , the subsets of workers preferred
to the empty set by f are called acceptable. Similarly, given a preference relation Pw of
worker w, the rms preferred to the empty set by w are called acceptable. By convention,
we declare the empty set as being acceptable for all agents. Since the set of agents will be
xed throughout the paper, we identify a matching problem with a preference prole P .
2.2 Matchings
A matching assigns each rm to a subset of workers (possibly empty) and each worker to
at most one rm, keeping the bilateral nature of the relationship; i.e., worker w works for
rm f if and only if rm f hires worker w.
Denition 1 A matching is a mapping  : W [ F  ! 2F[W with the properties:
(ma.1) (f) 2 2W for all f 2 F ;
(ma.2) (w) 2 2F and j(w)j  1 for all w 2 W ; and
(ma.3) w 2 (f) if and only if (w) = f .9
We follow the convention of describing matchings by a table. For instance, given W =
fw1; w2; w3; w4; w5g and F = ff1; f2; f3g; the table
f1 f2 f3
 fw1; w2g fw3; w4g ?
0 fw2; w5g fw3g fw1; w4g
means that at , f1 is matched to w1 and w2, f2 is matched to w3 and w4; and f3 and w5
are unmatched. Similarly, at 0; f1 is matched to w2 and w5, f2 is matched to w3; and f3
is matched to w1 and w4.
2.3 The Core
If matching is voluntary it should be immune to any secession of a coalition of agents that,
by matching only amongst themselves, could obtain better partners by breaking the former
9With a slight abuse of notation we treat (w) 6= ? as an element of F instead of one of its subsets; for
instance, we write (w) = f instead of (w) = ffg:
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partnerships and creating new ones (a block). The Core is the set of matchings that are
not blocked by any coalition of agents.
Denition 2 Let P be a preference prole and let  be a matching. Coalition W 0[F 0 
W [ F blocks  if there exists another matching 0 such that:
(bl.1) 0(f)  W 0 for all f 2 F 0;
(bl.2) either 0(w) = ? or 0(w) 2 F 0 for all w 2 W 0; and
(bl.3) for all f 2 F 0;
0(f)Rf(f); (1)
for all w 2 W 0,
0(w)Rw(w); (2)
and at least one of the weak preferences in (1) and (2) is strict.
Denition 3 Let P be a preference prole. A matching  is in the Core (at P ) if it is
not blocked by any coalition.
A matching  is individually rational (at P ) if (w)Rw? for all w 2 W and (f) =
Ch((f); Pf ) for all f 2 F . Denote by IR(P ) the set of individually rational matchings at
P . A matching  is pair-wise stable (at P ) if there is no unmatched pair (w; f) 2 W  F
such that fPw(w) and w 2 Ch((f) [ fwg; Pf ). The set of stable matchings (at P ) is
the set of individually rational matchings that are pair-wise stable. Let S(P ) denote the
set of stable matchings (at P ) and let C(P ) denote the set of matchings in the Core (at
P ). Obviously, C(P )  S(P ) for all P . It is well-known that there are preference proles
for which the Core (and the set of stable matchings) is empty. Example 1 below exhibits a
preference prole with an empty Core.
Example 1 Let F = ff1; f2g be the set of rms andW = fw1; w2g be the set of workers.
Consider the preference prole P = (Pf1 ; Pf2 ; Pw1 ; Pw2)
Pf1 Pf2 Pw1 Pw2
fw1; w2g fw2g f2 f1
fw1g fw1g f1 f2
? ? ? ?
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where we only list acceptable partners in decreasing order.10 The table below identies a
blocking coalition for each individually rational matching.
f1 f2 a blocking coalition
1 fw1; w2g ? fw1; f2g
2 fw1g ? fw2; f2g
3 fw1g fw2g fw1; w2; f1g
4 ? ? fw1; f1g
5 ? fw1g fw2; f2g
6 ? fw2g fw1; f1g
Thus, C(P ) = ?: 
Kelso and Crawford (1982) proposed (in a more general many-to-one matching model) a
condition on the preference relations of rms, called substitutability, with the property that
if in a prole P all rms have substitutable preference relations then the Core is non-empty
and coincides with the set of stable matchings. For this reason substitutability has played
a central role in the analysis of many-to-one matching models.
Denition 4 A rm fs preference relation Pf satises substitutability if for any set S
containing workers w and w0 (w 6= w0), if w 2 Ch (S; Pf ) then w 2 Ch (Sn fw0g ; Pf ).
Substitutability precludes strong complementarities among workers since it requires that
the desirability of a worker w in a particular set S does not come exclusively from the
presence of another worker w0 in that set; i.e., the rm still wants to hire worker w even
though worker w0 is not available anymore; thus, w is a good worker (in the context of the set
S) not only because of the presence of w0: A preference prole P is substitutable if for each
rm f , the preference relation Pf satises substitutability. Let S be the set of substitutable
preference proles. For any substitutable preference prole P 2 S, C(P ) = S (P ) 6= ?:
However, there are non substitutable preference proles P for which C(P ) 6= ?: Observe
that this statement does not contradict Hateld and Kojimas (2008) result stating that
the set of substitutable preference proles S is the maximal domain of preference proles
10Observe that in general the relative orderings of unacceptable partners (subsets of workers or individual
rms) are irrelevant from the point of view of the set of matchings in the Core since any agent can block
any matching in which he is matched to an unacceptable partner.
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containing S under which the set of Core matchings is non-empty.11 In their setting,
maximal domain means that if Pf is not substitutable then there exists a substitutable
subprole P f (perhaps a unique one) with the property that C(Pf ; P f ) = ?. However,
in general there may exist many subproles P 0 f for which C(Pf ; P
0
 f ) 6= ?.
2.4 Extracting Binary Relations from FirmsPreferences
To identify, given a preference relation of a rm (over the family of all subsets of workers),
the subfamily of subsets of workers on which we will dene the partial order that keeps
only the relevant relations (from the point of view of the Core) between subsets of workers,
we need some additional notions and notation.
Let A be a non-empty subfamily of subsets ofW containing the empty set; i.e., A  2W
and ? 2 A. A partial order  on A is a reexive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary
relation on A. Observe that weak preferences of rms are complete partial orders on 2W .
Given a binary relation  on A; let  be the antireexive and transitive binary relation on
A induced by  on A as follows: for S; S 0 2 A, S  S 0 if S  S 0 and S 6= S 0. A binary
relation  on A is acyclic if for all S1; :::; Sk 2 A such that S1 6= Sk, S1  :::  Sk implies
Sk  S1. A binary relation  on A has a maximal element on B  A if there exists S 2 B
such that for all S 0 2 B with S 0 6= S, S  S 0 holds where  is induced by . Then, given
a preference relation Pf and a set S 2 2W , Pf has a maximal element on the family of
all subsets of S: We have denoted this set by Ch(S; Pf ) and called it the choice set of S
according to Pf ; namely, Ch(S; Pf )PfS 0 for all S 0 2 2SnCh(S; Pf ):
It will be useful to understand (and to denote) a binary relation  on A as a subset of
A  A; namely, for all S; T 2 A; (S; T ) 2 A  A if and only if S  T: Hence, for two
binary relations  and 0 on A the notation 0 means that if S; S 0 2 A and S  S 0
then, S 0 S 0.
After these preliminaries we now turn to dene the procedure to delete from the pref-
erence relation of a rm the orderings between those pairs of subsets of workers that are
11In fact, Hateld and Kojima (2008) shows that this maximality result holds for the set of weak substi-
tutable preference proles in the more general model of matching with contracts. Their weak substitutability
condition in the model of matching with contracts coincides with the notion of substitutability in the purely
ordinal matching model analyzed in this paper.
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irrelevant with respect to the set of matchings in the Core. First, subsets that are not the
choice set of themselves can be left unordered since no matching in the Core, regardless
of the other agentspreference relations, matches this rm with any of these subsets. For-
mally, given the preference relation Pf on 2W , dene the family APf of individually rational
subsets of workers relative to Pf as the collection of sets that are choice sets of themselves;
that is,
APf = fS 2 2W j S = Ch(S; Pf )g:
Second, some pairs of subsets of workers in APf will be left unordered. Specically,
dene the binary relation Pf on APf obtained from Pf as follows: for all S; S 0 2 APf ;
S Pf S 0 if and only if S = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ):
Again, the binary relation Pf on APf leaves as unordered (i) all sets in 2W that are
not the choice of themselves and (ii) those pairs of sets in APf whose union contains a set
that is preferred to each of the two sets.12 Martínez, Massó, Neme, and Oviedo (2008)
show that if Pf is substitutable then Pf is a partial order on APf and (APf ;Pf ) is a
semilattice; namely, for every S; S 0 2 APf , lubPf fS; S 0g 2 APf (where, given a family of
subsets T , lubPf T means the least upper bound of T ). Example 2 below shows that if Pf
is not substitutable then the binary relation Pf may not even be transitive.
Example 2 Let W = fw1; w2; w3; w4; w5g be the set of workers and let f be a rm.
Consider the preference relation
Pf : fw1; w5g; fw1; w2g; fw3; w4g; fw4; w5g; f?g;
where we only list acceptable subsets of workers in decreasing order of preference. Observe
that Pf is not substitutable since w5 2 Ch(W;Pf ) and w5 =2 Ch(Wnfw1g; Pf ) = fw3; w4g:
Moreover, the family of individually rational subsets of workers relative to Pf is APf =
ffw1; w5g; fw1; w2g; fw3; w4g; fw4; w5g; f?gg and
fw1; w2g = Ch (fw1; w2g [ fw3; w4g; Pf ) ;
fw3; w4g = Ch (fw3; w4g [ fw4; w5g; Pf ) ; and
fw1; w5g = Ch (fw1; w2g [ fw4; w5g; Pf ) :
12Blair (1988) was the rst to use this binary relation when showing that the set of stable matchings
with multiple partners has a lattice structure.
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Hence, fw1; w2g Pf fw3; w4g Pf fw4; w5g but fw1; w2g Pf fw4; w5g: Thus, the binary
relation Pf is not transitive and (APf ;Pf ) is not a semilattice. 
2.5 Preliminary Results
Example 2 shows that the binary relationPf may be incomplete onAPf (both fw1; w2g Pf
fw4; w5g and fw4; w5g Pf fw1; w2g hold) and that it may not inherit the transitivity of
Pf : Nevertheless, Remark 1 and Proposition 1 below establish that the binary relation Pf
inherit some other properties from the preference relation Pf .
Remark 1 Let S; S 0 2 APf be such that S Pf S 0: Then, SRfS 0:
Proposition 1 Let Pf be a preference relation over 2W . Then, the binary relation Pf
on APf is reexive, antisymmetric, acyclic, and has a maximal element on APf .
Proof Let S 2 APf : Since S = Ch (S; Pf ) = Ch (S [ S; Pf ) ; S Pf S: Thus, Pf is
reexive.
Let S; S 0 2 APf and suppose S Pf S 0 and S 0 Pf S. Since S = Ch (S [ S 0; Pf ) = S 0;
S = S 0: Thus, Pf is antisymmetric.
Let S1; :::; Sk 2 APf be such that
S1 6= Sk (3)
and suppose S1 Pf    Pf Sk and Sk Pf S1: By Remark 1,
SkRfS1 (4)
and S1Rf    RfSk. By transitivity of Rf , S1RfSk: By (3), S1PfSk. This contradicts (4).
Thus, Pf is acyclic.
Let S = Ch(W;Pf ) be the most preferred subset of workers according to Pf ; i.e., for all
S 0 2 2WnS; SPfS 0: Thus, S = Ch(S; Pf ) and S 2 APf . By denition of S;
S = Ch (S [ S 0; Pf ) (5)
for all S 0 2 2W : In particular, if S 0 2 APf then, (5) holds. Hence, S Pf S 0 for all S 0 2 APf .
Since Pf is antisymmetric, S Pf S 0 for all S 0 2 APfnS. Thus, Pf has a maximal element
on APf . 
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3 The Invariance Result
Theorem 1 below gives a simple procedure to partition the set of rm fs preference relations
into equivalence classes where each class contains exactly those preference relations for
which the set of Core matchings is invariant regardless of the other agents preference
relations. Theorem 1 says that an equivalence class is composed of all rm fs preference
relations for which the binary relation obtained from them coincide.
Theorem 1 Let Pf and P 0f be two preference relations over 2
W . Then,
Pf=P 0f if and only if C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ) for all P f .
Proof ( )) Let Pf and P 0f be two preference relations such that Pf=P 0f . Thus,
APf = AP 0f . Assume there exist P f and  such that  2 C(Pf ; P f )nC(P 0f ; P f ): Since
APf = AP 0f and  2 C(Pf ; P f );  (f) 2 APf = AP 0f ; i.e.,  (f) = Ch
 
 (f) ; P 0f

: Thus,
 2 IR(Pf ; P f ) \ IR(P 0f ; P f ): (6)
Dene P 0 = (P 0f ; P f ) and let (F
0;W 0; 0) be a block of  at P 0. By (6), there exist f 0 2 F 0
and S 0  W 0 such that 0(f 0) = S 0 and for all v 2 ff 0g [ S 0,
0(v)R0v(v); (7)
and there exists v 2 ff 0g [ S 0 such that
0(v)P 0v(v): (8)
If f 0 6= f; by (7) and (8), 0(v)Rv(v) and 0(v)Pv(v): Hence (ff 0g; S 0; 0) blocks  at
(Pf ; P f ). This contradicts the hypothesis that  2 C(Pf ; P f ): Thus, f 0 = f: Hence
(ffg; 0(f); 0) blocks  at P 0: If 0(f) 6= Ch  0(f); P 0f then (ffg; Ch  0(f); P 0f ; 00)
also blocks  at P; where 00 is such that 00(f) = Ch
 
0(f); P 0f

and 00(f^) = ? for
all f^ 6= f: Hence, and since APf = AP 0f ; we can assume without loss of generality that
0(f) = Ch
 
0(f); P 0f

= Ch (0(f); Pf ) : Since  2 C(Pf ; P f ),
(f)Pf
0(f) and 0(f)P 0f(f):
Thus,
0(f) Pf (f) and (f) P 0f 
0(f): (9)
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By the hypothesis that Pf=P 0f ;
0(f) P 0f (f) and (f) Pf 
0(f): (10)
Consider any matching ^ with the property that ^(f) = Ch ( (f) [ 0 (f) ; Pf ). We now
show that, (ffg; Ch ( (f) [ 0 (f) ; Pf ) ; ^) blocks  at (Pf ; P f ): Since (10) we have that
^(f)Pf(f): Let w 2 ^(f): Either w 2 (f), in which case w 2 S 0 and ^(w)Rw(w) since
^(w) = (w) or else, w 2 0(f), in which case ^(w) = f = 0(w)Rw(w) by (7) and
Rw = R
0
w: This contradicts the hypothesis that  2 C(Pf ; P f ):
(() Let Pf and P 0f be such that C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ) for all P f . We rst show
that APf = AP 0f . Assume S 2 APf : We want to show that S 2 AP 0f (by symmetry, this will
su¢ ce). Consider the following subprole P f : for all w 2 S, all w0 =2 S; and all f^ 6= f ,
Pw Pw0 Pf^
f ? ?
?:
The unique core matching at (Pf ; P f ) is ; where (f) = S and (f^) = ? for all f^ 6= f
(obviously, (w0) = ? for all w0 =2 S): By hypothesis, C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ): Hence,
 is individually rational at (P 0f ; P f ): Thus, S 2 AP 0f . To show that Pf=P 0f assume
S1; S2 2 APf = AP 0f are such that S1 Pf S2; but S1 P 0f S2. Then,
S1 6= Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

Consider the following preference prole P f : for all w 2 S1 [ S2, all w0 =2 S1 [ S2; and all
f^ 6= f ,
Pw Pw0 Pf^
f ? ?
?:
Let  be the matching where (f) = S1; (f^) = ? for all f^ 6= f; and (w0) = ? for all w0 =2
S1: Since S1 Pf S2, S1 = Ch(S1 [ S2; Pf ): It is easy to check that  2 C(Pf ; P f ): Since
S1 6= Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

, Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

P 0fS1. Thus, (ffg; Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

; 0), where 0
is any matching such that 0(f) = Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P 0f

, blocks  at (P 0f ; P f ) since
0(f)P 0f(f) = S1;
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and for all w 2 Ch  S1 [ S2; P 0f ;
f = 0(w)Rw(w):
Hence,  =2 C(P 0f ; P f ): This contradicts the hypothesis that C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ). 
An alternative way of describing Theorem 1 in terms of the Core correspondence is as
follows. For a rm f and its preference relation Pf denote by Tf;Pf the Core mapping that
takes as arguments all subproles of preferences P f of workers and remaining rms and
such that Tf;Pf (P f ) = C(Pf ; P f ): Theorem 1 partitions the set of preference relations of
rm f into equivalence classes such that all preference relations in a class have the same
Core mapping.
Finally, Theorem 1 has the following implication. Consider two preference proles with
the property that workerspreference relations (on acceptable rms) are the same and for
each rm the two preference relations (in the two proles) have the same binary relation.
Then, the two proles have the same Core.
4 The Minimality Result
An implication of Theorem 1 is that an incomplete binary relation can be used as the
representative of each equivalence class of all preference relations of a rm that leave the
Core invariant. In general, the amount of information contained in the incomplete binary
relation is substantially smaller than the one contained in any of its associated preference
relations. However, this binary relation still contains redundant information (some pairs
of subsets of workers are unnecessarily ordered) since the same equivalence class could be
recovered by extending appropriately a strictly weaker binary relation. Example 3 below
illustrates this fact and how we will proceed.
Example 3 Let W = fw1; w2; w3g be the set of workers and let f be a rm. Consider
the preference relation Pf over 2W
fw1; w2; w3gPffw1; w2gPffw1; w3gPffw2; w3gPffw1gPffw2gPffw3gPff?g:
Observe that APf = 2
W . Obviously, S Pf S for all S 2 APf . In addition, Pf consists of
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the following orderings:
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw1; w2g fw1; w2g Pf fw1g fw1g Pf f?g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw1; w3g fw1; w2g Pf fw2g fw2g Pf f?g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw2; w3g fw1; w2g Pf f?g fw3g Pf f?g:
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw1g fw1; w3g Pf fw1g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw2g fw1; w3g Pf fw3g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf fw3g fw1; w3g Pf f?g
fw1; w2; w3g Pf f?g fw2; w3g Pf fw2g
fw2; w3g Pf fw3g
fw2; w3g Pf f?g
Note that fw1; w2gPffw1; w3g, fw1; w2gPffw2; w3g; and fw1; w3gPffw2; w3g but fw1; w2g Pf
fw1; w3g, fw1; w2g Pf fw2; w3g; and fw1; w3g Pf fw2; w3g because fw1; w2; w3g =
Ch(fw1; w2g [ fw1; w3g; Pf ) = Ch(fw1; w2g [ fw2; w3g; Pf ) = Ch(fw1; w3g [ fw2; w3g; Pf ).
From the point of view of the Core, the only relevant information contained in Pf (together
with the fact that APf = 2
W ) is that the best subset of workers is W itself (this is true as
long as we extend the binary relation by making sure that if one set of workers is strictly
contained in another set then, the larger set is strictly preferred to the smaller one in the
extension). The relative orderings among subsets of cardinality two and the relative or-
derings among subsets of cardinality one are irrelevant for the set of Core matchings. For
instance, in this case the three preference relations P 0f , P
00
f ; and P
000
f dened by
fw1; w2; w3gP 0ffw1; w2gP 0ffw2; w3gP 0ffw1; w3gP 0ffw1gP 0ffw2gP 0ffw3gP 0ff?g
fw1; w2; w3gP 00f fw1; w2gP 00f fw1; w3gP 00f fw2; w3gP 00f fw2gP 00f fw1gP 00f fw3gP 00f f?g
fw1; w2; w3gP 000f fw1; w2gP 000f fw2; w3gP 000f fw1; w3gP 000f fw2gP 000f fw1gP 000f fw3gP 000f f?g
have the property that C(Pf ; P f ) = C(P 0f ; P f ) = C(P
00
f ; P f ) = C(P
000
f ; P f ) for any
subprole P f : Indeed, we will show that from the information conveyed by the fact that
APf = 2
W and the much weaker (and minimal) binary relation mPf= f?g, where no pair of
subsets of workers are related, we will be able to extract the class of (complete) preference
relations on 2W that leave the Core invariant. Observe that the number of pairs related
by Pf (nineteen or twenty seven if we include those that follow from reexivity) is much
larger than the number of pairs related by mPf (none). But this is an extreme case.
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Consider now the preference relation P^f over 2W
fw1; w2gP^ffw1gP^ffw2gP^ffw3gP^ff?g,
where we only list acceptable partners. Then, AP^f = ffw1; w2g; fw1g; fw2g; fw3g; f?gg
and fw1; w2g P^f fw1g, fw1; w2g P^f fw2g, fw1; w2g P^f fw3g, fw1g P^f fw3g, fw2g P^f
fw3g, and for any S 2 AP^f ; S P^f S and S P^f f?g. Observe rst that fw1g P^f fw2g and
fw2g P^f fw1g, and that the orderings fw1; w2g P^f fw3g and fw1; w2g P^f f?g could be
recovered by transitivity (using either fw1g or fw2g as intermediate subset). In addition,
the orderings fw1; w2g P^f fw1g; fw1; w2g P^f fw2g and for any S 2 AP^f ; S P^f S
and S P^f f?g could also be recovered because they relate a set with one of its subsets.
Thus, we could dene a much weaker binary relation m
P^f
on AP^f with only two elements:
fw1g mP^f fw3g and fw2g 
m
P^f
fw3g. Moreover, given AP^f (this conveys a very important
information), the two preference relations P^f (the one that we started with) and Pf over
2W (again, we only list acceptable partners)
fw1; w2gP^ffw1gP^ffw2gP^ffw3gP^ff?g
fw1; w2g Pffw2g Pffw1g Pffw3g Pff?g
can be obtained from m
P^f
as what we will call strict extensions. Our results will say that
C(P^f ; P f ) = C( Pf ; P f ) for all subproles P f . On the other hand, if we had left the
two subsets fw1g and fw3g unordered we could have found two strict extensions Pf and ~Pf
with the property that C( Pf ; P f ) 6= C( ~Pf ; P f ) for some subprole P f ; in this sense the
binary relation m
P^f
on AP^f will be called minimal. 
In the sequel we dene a minimal binary relation that will declare as unordered (i) any
two subsets of workers with the property that one is a strict subset of the other and (ii) any
two subsets of workers whose relative ordering (for instance, S Pf S 00) could be obtained
by transitivity (i.e., S and S 00 will be left unordered whenever there exists S 0 2 APf such
that S Pf S 0 Pf S 00).
In this section we identify the minimal binary relation (weaker than the one used as the
representative of the class) with the following two properties: (i) all preference relations
in the class can be obtained from this minimal binary relation by what we call a strict
extension, and (ii) any strictly weaker binary relation has at least two strict extensions that
belong to two di¤erent equivalence classes.
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4.1 Transitive Closure
To make the proof of Theorem 2 below simpler, we will now rst enlarge Pf with its
transitive closure TPf and then reduce it by identifying a minimal binary relation mPf so
that mPfPfTPf :
Denition 5 Let  be an acyclic binary relation on A. The binary relation T on A is
the transitive closure of  if it is the smallest transitive binary relation on A that contains
.
Notice that the all-relation on A  A is transitive and contains all binary relations on
A. The intersection of transitive binary relations on A is again transitive; that is, given ,
T= \f0 A  A j0 and 0 is transitiveg is transitive. Finally, let  be an acyclic
binary relation on A. Then, T= [n2N n, where S n S 0 if there exist S1; :::; Sn 2 A such
that S = S1      Sn = S 0.13
Before proceeding we state and prove a Lemma that will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 1 Let Pf be a preference relation over 2W and assume that S1; S2 2 APf ; S1 TPf
S2; and S1  S2: Then, S1 = S2:
Proof Since S1  S2 and S2 2 APf ; Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) = Ch (S2; Pf ) = S2: Hence, S2 Pf
S1 and S2 TPf S1: By hypothesis, S1 TPf S2. By Proposition 1, Pf is antisymmetric. By
its denition, TPf is antisymmetric as well. Thus, S1 = S2: 
4.2 Minimal Binary Relation
To identify the minimal binary relation associated to the preference relation Pf of rm f
we proceed as follows. First, obtain APf . Second, compute Pf and its transitive closure
TPf . Then, delete from TPf all ordered pairs of subsets of workers that (i) are related by
inclusion and (ii) are related as the consequence of the transitivity of TPf . Formally,
Denition 6 Let Pf be a preference relation over 2W . The binary relation TPf on
APf is minimal if for all S; S
0 2 APf such that S TPf S 0 the following condition holds:
(mi) S  S 0 if and only if S \ S 0 =2 fS; S 0g and there does not exist S 00 2 APfn fS; S 0g such
that; S TPf S 00 TPf S 0.
13See Harzheim (2005).
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Given Pf , there is a unique minimal binary relation on APf : Denote it by mPf : Next
lemma states that mPf is not only weaker than TPf but it is also weaker than the original
Pf .
Lemma 2 Let Pf be a preference relation over 2W . Then, mPfPf :
Proof To obtain a contradiction assume mPf*Pf ; namely, there exist S; S 0 2 APf
such that S mPf S 0 and S Pf S 0: Since, by Proposition 1, Pf is reexive, S 6= S 0.
Observe that mPfTPf and S mPf S 0 imply S TPf S 0. Since S Pf S 0 and S TPf S 0,
by denition of TPf there exists S1; :::; Sn 2 APf such that S 6= S1 6=    6= Sn 6= S 0 and
S Pf S1 Pf    Pf Sn Pf S 0. Since TPf is transitive by denition, this implies that
S TPf S1 TPf S 0. By (mi) in Denition 6, S mPf S 0; a contradiction. 
Alternatively, we could directly dene mPfPf replacing condition (mi) in Denition
6 above by
(mi) S  S 0 if and only if S \S 0 =2 fS; S 0g and there does not exist S 00 2 APfn fS; S 0g such
that; S Pf S 00 Pf S 0.
However, the arguments would become more involved since instead of using the transitivity
of TPf we should use the acyclicity of Pf by identifying (and working with) sequences
S1 Pf    Pf Sk with the property that Sk Pf S1.
4.3 Strict Extension
We next give a procedure to obtain from the minimal binary relation all preference relations
that would generate it. The procedure consists of completing the acyclic minimal binary
relation by declaring a set in the family to be (strictly) preferred to all its subsets and if a
set is not in the family of individually rational subsets of workers then it must have a strict
subset that belongs to the family and is strictly preferred to it. Formally,
Denition 7 Let  be an acyclic binary relation on A  2W with ? 2 A. The (strict)
preference relation P f over 2W is a strict extension of  if for all S 0; S 00 2 A such that
S 0 6= S 00 :
(se.1) if S 0  S 00 then, S 0P fS 00;
(se.2) if S 00  S 0 then, S 0P fS 00; and
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(se.3) if S =2 A then, there exists S^ 2 A such that S^  S and S^P fS:
Denition 7 can be seen as a set of instructions on how to extend an acyclic binary
relation on A to a preference relation over 2W . First, it preserves all the ordered pairs (this
corresponds to the standard notion of an extension used by Szpilrajn (1930)). Second, a
set is preferred to all its subsets. Third, if a set is not in A then, we have freedom on how
to order it but the set has to be worse than one of its subsets (perhaps the empty set).
Finally, all the remaining pairs that are not ordered by the acyclic binary relation can be
freely ordered by the preference relation (this is one of the reasons of why in general there
are many strict extensions of an acyclic binary relation). Before proceeding, we state and
prove two results: Lemma 3 will be useful in the proof of Theorem 2 below and Lemma 4
states that indeed Pf is obtained as a strict extension of mPf .
Lemma 3 Let Pf be a preference relation over 2W . Suppose P f is a strict extension of
mPf : Furthermore, assume S; S 0 2 APf ; S 6= S 0 and S TPf S 0: Then, SP fS 0:
Proof If S mPf S 0 then, by (se.1) in Denition 7, SP fS 0:
Assume S mPf S
0: By Lemma 1, and since S TPf S 0 and S 6= S 0; S " S 0: Thus, either
S  S 0 or there exists S1 2 APf such that S TPf S1 TPf S 0: If S  S 0 then, by (se.2) in
Denition 7, SP fS 0:
Assume there exists S1 2 APf such that S1 6= S; S 0 and S TPf S1 TPf S 0; We assume
without lost of generality that S1 is maximal with respect to TPf ; i.e., there does not exist
S^ 2 A; S^ 6= S1; S; S 0 such that S TPf S^ TPf S1 TPf S 0: Observe that by Proposition 1,
Pf is acyclic and hence, by Lemma 2, mPf is also acyclic. Thus, this maximal set S1 does
exist.
Assume S mPf S1: Then, if there would exist S^ 2 APf such that S TPf S^ TPf S1 then,
S TPf S^ TPf S1 TPf S 0; contradicting the maximality of S1: Because S TPf S1; by (mi) in
Denition 6, either S  S1 or S1  S: Note that if S1  S; and since S TPf S1, Lemma
1 implies S = S 0: This contradicts S mPf S1 because, by Proposition 1, Pf is reexive.
Hence, and since mPfTPf ; mPf is reexive as well. Thus, S  S1: By (se.2) in Denition
7, any strict extension P f of mPf satises SP fS1:
Assume S mPf S1: By (se.1) in Denition 7, any strict extension P f of mPf satises
SP fS1:
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We have already shown that SP fS1 and S1 TPf S 0: If S1 mPf S 0; by (se.1) in Denition
7, S1P fS 0; in which case, SP fS 0: If S1 mPf S
0; we repeat the argument above replacing the
former role of S by S1. Since APf is nite, there exists a nite sequence fS1; :::; Skg such
that SP fS1P f    P fSkP fS 0: By transitivity of P f , SP fS 0: 
Lemma 4 Let Pf be a preference relation over 2W . Then, Pf is a strict extension of the
minimal binary relation mPf .
Proof We consider separately the three cases in Denition 7. For the rst two, let
S1; S2 2 APf be such that S1 6= S2:
(se.1) Assume S1 mPf S2: By Lemma 2, S1 Pf S2; i.e., S1 = Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) : Since
S1 6= S2; S1PfS2:
(se.2) Assume S2  S1. To obtain a contradiction, assume S2PfS1. Then, S1 6= Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) =
Ch (S1; Pf ), where the equality follows because S2  S1: But this is a contradiction with
S1 2 Af :
(se.3) Let S =2 APf :We want to show that there exists S^ 2 APf such that S^ ( S and S^PfS:
Note that Ch (S; Pf ) 2 APf and Ch(S; Pf )  S. Since S =2 APf ; Ch(S; Pf )PfS: Thus, set
the desired S^ be equal to Ch(S; Pf ): Then, S^PfS: 
4.4 Results
We are now ready to state and prove the two results of this section.
Theorem 2 Let Pf be a preference relation over 2W and assume P f is a strict extension
of the minimal binary relation mPf . Then, AP f = APf and P f=Pf :
Before proving Theorem 2 two remarks are in order. First, the statement of Theorem 2
implicitly contains the following procedure that we want to make explicit before we proceed
to its proof. Given a preference relation Pf over 2W , construct the family APf of individually
rational subsets of workers relative to Pf . From APf , obtain sequentially the binary relation
Pf on APf , its transitive closure TPf , and the minimal binary relation mPf . Then, take
an arbitrary strict extension P f of mPf , construct the family AP f and its associated binary
relation P f . Theorem 2 says that APf = AP f and Pf=P f hold. Second, Theorem 2
implies (together with Theorem 1) that the minimal binary relation can be used as the
representative of all preference relations that leave the set of Core matchings invariant;
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namely, mPf still contains all information needed to obtain the full equivalence class of
preference relations as strict extensions of mPf :
We now turn to prove Theorem 2.
Proof We rst prove that AP f = APf : To show that AP f  APf ; we will show that
S =2 APf implies S =2 AP f . Assume S =2 APf . Hence, and since P f is a strict extension of
mPf ; by (se.3), there exists S^ 2 APf such that S^ ( S and S^P fS: Thus, S 6= Ch(S; P f ) and
S =2 AP f .
To show that APf  AP f ; assume S 2 APfnAP f . Hence,
S = Ch(S; Pf ) (11)
and S 6= Ch(S; P f ): Let S 0 ( S be such that S 0 = Ch(S; P f ): Obviously, S 0 = Ch(S 0; P f )
and
S 0P fS: (12)
Thus, S 0 2 AP f . Hence, and since we have already proved that AP f  APf ; S 0 2 APf :
Thus, S 0 = Ch(S 0; Pf ): By S 0  S and (11), S = Ch(S [ S 0; Pf ): Hence, S Pf S 0: Thus,
S TPf S 0. By Lemma 3, SP fS 0; a contradiction with (12).
Second, to prove P f=Pf we will show that for all S1; S2 2 AP f = APf ,
S1 = Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f

if and only if S1 = Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) :
=)) Assume S1 6= Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) : Hence, Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) Pf S1: By denition of
TPf , Ch(S1[S2; Pf ) TPf S1. By Lemma 3, Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf )P fS1. Since Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) 
S1 [ S2, S1 6= Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f

:
(=) To obtain a contradiction, assume S1 = Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) and S1 6= Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f

:
Then, Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f
 P f S1: Since Ch(S1[S2; P f )  S1[S2 and S1 = Ch(S1[S2; Pf );
S1 Pf Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f

: By denition of TPf ; S1 TPf Ch(S1 [ S2; P f ): By Lemma 3,
S1P fCh
 
S1 [ S2; P f

; a contradiction with Ch
 
S1 [ S2; P f
 P f S1: 
Theorem 3 below states that mPf is indeed minimal in the sense that any strictly weaker
binary relation generates, as one of its strict extensions, a preference relation of rm f that
belongs to a di¤erent equivalence class of the one to which Pf belongs to and thus, with a
di¤erent Core for some subprole P f .
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Theorem 3 Let Pf be a preference relation and assume 0 mPf . Then, there exists a
strict extension P 0f of 0 such that P 0f 6=Pf :
Proof Since 0 mPf , there exist S1; S2 2 APf such that S1 mPf S2; but S1 0 S2: By
(mi) in Denition 6, S1 mPf S2; implies that neither S1 ) S2 nor S2 ) S1: Let P 0f be a
strict extension of 0 with the property that S2P 0fS1: Observe that none of the hypothesis
of conditions (se.1), (se.2), and (se.3) in Denition 7 hold; thus, there exists such extension
P 0f . Then, S1 6= Ch(S1 [ S2; P 0f ): Hence, mPfPf and S1 mPf S2 imply that, by Lemma
2, S1 Pf S2; namely, S1 = Ch (S1 [ S2; Pf ) : Thus, Pf 6=P 0f : 
5 Concluding Remark
Our results give a systematic procedure to elicit from a given preference prole P the
minimal and indispensable information that is relevant for determining the set of Core
matchings at P . Specically, the main conclusions and implications of our results are the
following.
First, consider a preference prole P = ((Pf )f2F ; (Pw)w2W ). For each f 2 F , (a)
construct APf , the family of individually rational subsets of workers relative to Pf , by
identifying those subsets of workers that are the choice of themselves; and (b) dene the
binary relation Pf on APf from Pf by declaring, for each pair of subsets S and S 0 in
APf , that S is preferred (according to Pf ) to S 0 if and only if S is the best subset of
workers (according to Pf) among all subsets of the union of S and S 0. All information
needed to compute the set of Core matchings at preference prole P = ((Pf )f2F ; (Pw)w2W )
is contained in the prole = ((Pf )f2F ; (Pw)w2W ). In addition, any preference prole
P 0 = ((P 0f )f2F ; (Pw)w2W ) such that P 0f=Pf for all f 2 F has the property that the Core
at P 0 coincides with the Core at P:
Second, this prole of incomplete binary relations is still too rich since they order pairs
of subsets of workers that are related either by inclusion or by transitivity through an
intermediate subset of workers. We obtain from = ((Pf )f2F ; (Pw)w2W ) the prole m=
((mPf )f2F ; (Pw)w2W ) with the properties that for each f 2 F , (1) mPf is weaker than Pf
in the sense that it is contained (as a subset of APf  APf ) in Pf ; (2) we can obtain the
equivalence class of rm fs preference relations with the same set of Core matchings by
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strictly extending mPf ; and (3) mPf is the minimal binary relation for which properties (1)
and (2) hold.
Thus, we can substantially reduce the amount of information required from rms about
their preference relations when a direct revelation mechanism is applied to centralized,
two-sided, many-to-one matchings markets. In particular, this is important when rms
preference relations are substitutable and the used mechanism is stable, as in many real
centralized markets like entry-level professional labor markets.
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